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Abstract  
 
This paper aims at analysing the procurement of public works paying attention to 
the level of government involved. Such an issue has not received so far attention 
in the literature on fiscal federalism nor in the public works procurement 
literature. We focus the attention upon the execution stage of public works: 
indeed, their efficient provision and their capability to deliver the planned benefits 
are severely affected by the problems arising at the execution stage because of the 
incompleteness of the underlying contract. The main result is that local 
governments seem to be less efficient in the management of the execution process, 
suffering from longer delays than central government. This phenomenon is more 
severe for small municipalities and when the contract is mainly financed with 
external resources.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the procurement of public works paying 
attention to the level of government involved. Such an issue has not received so 
far attention in the literature on fiscal federalism nor in the public works 
procurement literature. 
 Indeed, public works represent investments which are relevant for the 
accumulation of the economic and social capital of local communities.1 The 
efficient provision of these goods and their capability to deliver the planned 
benefits are severely affected by the execution problems, arising because of the 
incompleteness of the underlying contract. Do these problems and their effects 
differ according to the level of government ? 
In this paper we try to address such a question and to offer a preliminary 
tentative answer, through an empirical analysis, based on data drawn from a large 
sample of Italian public works. In section 2 the main findings of the fiscal 
federalism literature will be recalled and their relevance for the public works 
procurement will be examined. In section 3, given the empirical nature of our 
analysis, we will discuss the potential determinants of the efficiency of execution 
of public works, alongside the different institutional identity of procurers. Section 
4 presents the main data and some preliminary statistical analysis. In section 5 an 
empirical analysis will be carried out, using Italian procurement data, the impact 
of decentralization on the efficiency in the execution of the contracts for public 
works will be analysed and some comments on the policy implications of the 
results will be provided. In section 6 some concluding remarks will be offered.  
 
2.  DECENTRALIZATION AND PUBLIC WORKS PROCUREMENT   
 
2.1 Public works have not been specifically addressed as “local output” in the 
literature on fiscal federalism, though it is widely agreed that infrastructure 
investment is “location or site-specific” as well as “jurisdiction specific” (Bird, 
1995). The “local” dimension may be addressed from different perspectives: the 
analysis of decentralization can be applied to the allocation process (what 
infrastructure, for whom)2 as well as to the implementation process (performance 
in terms of costs and time of completion). In this paper attention will be 
concentrated on the implementation phase; as Bird (1995) points out, the 
provision of infrastructure may vary according with the level of government 
involved in the design, financing, regulation, operation and maintenance of the 
infrastructure and, among the other things, the administrative regulatory 
framework (e.g. rules on contracting, dispute settlement) crucially affects the 
performance. Elsewhere (Guccio, Pignataro and Rizzo, forthcoming) it has been 
pointed out that public works rely on long-term incomplete contracts and that such 
                                                 
1
 A survey of the literature on infrastructure and growth is offered by Estache and Fay (2007), 
stressing that the relevance of infrastructures varies across countries and over time.  
2
 For a survey, see Estache and Fay (2007). 
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a feature crucially affects their capability to deliver the planned benefits, since it 
may negatively impact on the time and the costs of execution. Do these problems 
and their effects differ according to the level of government? This is a sound 
question, since public works is a field where different governments operate and, 
therefore, is a good area for “testing” federalism. Within such a perspective in 
what follows few hints coming from the longstanding literature on fiscal 
federalism will be recalled in relation with the main theme of this paper3 to test 
whether the reasons for decentralization stand as far as the execution of public 
works is concerned.  
As it is well known, in the literature several economic (efficiency) reasons for 
decentralization have been put forward. Traditionally, it has been claimed that, 
under certain assumptions, decentralization generates welfare gains in the 
resource allocation because local governments have better information about local 
residents preferences (and services costs)  and, therefore,  local outputs are 
Pareto superior to an outcome characterized by a centrally determined, uniform 
level of output across all jurisdictions. Local governments are also likely to be 
more accountable because of their closeness to citizens and decentralization, 
therefore, would enhance citizens’ participation. Different local outputs are likely 
to generate competition among local governments if citizens move from one 
jurisdiction to another. “Competition among jurisdictions forces governments to 
represent citizen interests and to preserve markets” (Qian and Weingast, 1997, p. 
88). Indeed, in a public choice perspective – i.e. with governments not acting in 
the best interest of the citizens -  fiscal decentralization inducing competition it is 
claimed to constrain public sector tendency to become inefficiently large (Brennan 
and Buchanan, 1980). Finally, decentralization would favour the experimentation 
of innovative policies to enhance the efficiency at local level.   
More recently, as Oates (2005) outlines, the literature on fiscal federalism 
moved toward the application of industrial-organization models to the public-
sector field. Attention is focused on political processes and the behaviour of 
political agents, on one hand, and on the effects of the distribution of information 
among the various agents participating to the collective decision-making process, 
on the other hand. In such a framework, the objectives of decision-makers derive  
from the underlying information and incentive structures prevailing in the 
centralized and decentralized systems; the traditional concepts such as 
accountability, proximity, and yardstick competition are cast in formal agency 
models (Tommasi-Weinschelbaum, 2007).  
However, alongside the above mentioned benefits, in the literature several 
shortcomings of decentralization have been put forward. Welfare gains might be 
severely reduced by the existence of economies of scale as well as of spillovers 
effects. At the same time, citizens/taxpayers might lack information and, 
therefore, might not be able to exert the claimed political control. Local 
governments might be unable to carry on public policies and local bureaucracy 
might be less trained than the central one. Moreover, because of the closeness to 
                                                 
3
 Qian and Weingast (1997) distinguish between a First Generation Theory and a Second 
Generation Theory. An exhaustive survey has been provided by Oates (2005) 
 4 
citizens local governments might be more open to corruption4 and captured by 
lobbies and vested interests. Redoano (2003) emphasizes that the link between 
decentralization and lobbying is ambiguous; Bordignon- Colombo- Galmarini 
(2003), reach the conclusion that there can be more lobbying and distortion of 
policy choice under decentralization when firms lobby for the market.5  
In very general terms, as Oates (2005) points out, there is a trade-off in terms 
of local “accountability” (sensitivity of outcomes to local preferences) versus 
central internalization of interjurisidictional interdependencies; “ the key insight 
remains that heterogeneity and spillovers are correctly at the heart of the debate 
about the gains from centralization” (Besley and Coate, 2003, p. 2628). In the 
definition of such a trade-off a crucial role is plaid by the intergovernmental fiscal 
relations and by the ways they are designed. The functioning of a decentralized 
system heavily depends not only on the assignment of functions but also on the 
means of financing,6 on the existence of distributive schemes and of rules to 
ensure the fiscal discipline. It is widely agreed that the efficiency gains deriving 
by decentralization are closely linked with hard budget constraints, i.e. with the 
reliance of local governments on own sources of revenues for the finance of their 
budgets;7 on the contrary, if the fiscal system provides a “bailout” for local 
governments, there will be incentives for decentralized governments to expand 
public programs well beyond efficient levels.8 Notwithstanding the design of the 
rules, what is crucial is the credibility of central government commitment to avoid 
bailouts 9  and its strength to resist the pressure of local governments. 
Decentralization, in order to be effective, may require a reasonably strong central 
government (Oates, 2005).    
In recent years, interest in fiscal decentralization has been rising in  
international organizations (such as the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank,  the Organisation for Economic, Co-operation and Development and the 
Inter-American Development Bank), as part of broader strategies for enhancing 
efficiency of the public sector and for strengthening participatory and democratic 
decision-making at local government. In such a context, fiscal decentralization 
                                                 
4
 Utilizing cross country data, Fisman and Gatti (2002) found that decentralization is associated 
with lower levels of corruption. 
5
 “Under decentralization lobbying always leads the local politicians to give access to the market 
to the resident firm only, although a duopoly may be better for social welfare. No matter the degree 
of politicians’ benevolence, in fact, the local firm can always outbid the foreign firm to gain access 
to the market, because only this firm’s profits matter for the local politicians’ welfare” (Bordignon 
et al., p. 4).  
6
 Ambrosanio and Bordignon (2006) offer a survey of the theoretical issues raised by local 
taxation. Bardhan and  Mookherjee (2006), compare the efficiency effects of alternative means of 
financing reaching the conclusion that user fees ensure that decentralisation generates higher 
efficiency and equity compared to centralisation and are preferable to coercive local taxes.   
7
 The implications of  soft budget constraints in intergovernmental relationships, with special 
reference to Italy, have been investigated by Bordignon (2000).  
8
 Starting with Oates (1985), a large empirical literature has analysed the effects of 
decentralization of fiscal powers on government size and controversial results have been reached 
(for a survey, see Fiva, 2005).  
9
 As Wildasin (2004) points out, the spillover effects of local governments fiscal behaviour are 
also relevant and, therefore,  bailouts are more likely for larger local jurisdictions than smaller 
ones.  
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remains a controversial issue, the main concerns being that levels of government 
that are the closest to people often are captured by lobbies and may be corrupted.  
Moreover, it is also argued that the outcomes of the processes of decentralization 
in terms of participation are affected by the institutional, economic and cultural 
features of  each country (Andrews- de Vries 2007). As Bardhan and  
Mookherjee (2006) point out, many developing countries in Latin America, Asia 
and Africa are trying to increase the accountability of service providers by 
providing greater control rights to citizen groups, for instance through the 
decentralisation of service delivery and  community participation10 but “these 
trends towards decentralisation are difficult to interpret within the confines of the 
traditional literature on fiscal federalism, owing to the lack of attention devoted in 
that literature to problems of accountability in service” (p. 102).  
Indeed, more in general, those who support fiscal decentralization argue that, 
among other benefits, it can increase the efficiency of delivery of government 
services but no much attention has been devoted to such an issue in the empirical 
literature.11 This paper tries to move in this direction looking at the specific case 
of public works.  
 
2.2  Indeed, the issue of heterogeneity and diversity which is crucial in the fiscal 
federalism field exhibits different features in the case of infrastructures than in the 
case of services such as education, social services, culture and so on. The 
relationship between citizens’ demand and supply in the infrastructure case is 
affected by the instrumental nature of this good. In the latter case, the consumer 
directly evaluates the quality of the service delivered (for instance, education, 
water supply), if fees are required can assess its value for money and, eventually, 
in some cases, if it is not satisfied can look for alternative means of supply. In 
other words, the production process can be evaluated by the final consumer in line 
with the above mentioned concepts of accountability and yardstick competition. 
When dealing with public works, these concepts do not apply in the same way: 
the production process of the infrastructure, e.g. the school, cannot be evaluated 
straightforwardly by the consumer but the infrastructure is relevant as input of the 
service. Therefore, in the public works case consumers’ asymmetrical information 
is more severe that in the public service case, which is more commonly addressed 
in the literature on fiscal federalism. However, some features of the public work, 
depending on the implementation process, can be perceived and appreciated by 
consumers; for instance whether the completion of the work is on time, affects the 
production of the expected benefit and, therefore, political pressure is likely to 
arise. The responsiveness of local governments as far as the implementation of 
public works is concerned is affected by scope of the autonomous local decision-
making as well as the related financial aspects.  
 
                                                 
10
 The programmes include a wide range of infrastructure services (water, sanitation, electricity, 
telecommunications, roads) and social services (education, health and welfare programmes). 
11
 Barankay-Lockwood (2006) analyse the relationship between expenditure decentralization and 
the productive efficiency of government using a data-set of Swiss cantons and provide evidence 
that more decentralization is associated with higher educational attainment. 
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2.3  In Italy, the procurement system is national, it is based on a detailed and 
complex set of centrally determined  rules and local governments (Regions) have 
only limited autonomy for marginal changes of the national legislation.12 Italian 
procurement rules are quite strict in specifying how decisions should be taken (for 
instance, “award to the lowest bidder,”) or what process has to be followed in 
making a decision (for instance, “do not accept late proposals”, “evaluate 
proposals only based on the evaluation criteria in the solicitation”). The law tries 
to reduce bureaucratic discretion as much as possible. On these grounds, 
preference is given to competition13: procurements should be widely advertised 
and evaluated strictly on the criteria announced in advance. Sealed bids are used 
to prevent collusion among the participants and to ensure transparency. As far as 
the specification of the contract is concerned, cost plus contract are not allowed to 
prevent opportunistic behaviour of private contractors.  
Elsewhere (Guccio, Pignataro and Rizzo, 2008), it has been argued that the 
«philosophy» underlying the above mentioned procurement rules does not always 
seem in line with the economic reality of procurement: purchasing with 
anonymous sellers or  the impossibility of promising  future contracts in 
presence of good performance make difficult to establish any relationship between 
the purchaser and the seller and does not necessarily ensure the quality of the 
outcome. Indeed, in such a regulated environment, there is a very limited scope 
for discretion and, therefore, the potentialities of decentralization in terms of 
efficiency gains and of experimentation of innovative solutions are somehow  
restricted.  
On the other hand, in such a scenario other factors come into play. It has been 
previously pointed out that there is a risk for the local decision-maker of  being 
captured by firms lobbying for the market. Political reasons might also be used to 
support the view that local decision makers are likely to «buy local».14  Local 
policy-makers are under constant pressure from local interest groups to protect 
their specific interests and procurement can be a powerful tool to achieve political 
objectives such as, the protection of local industry, the supporting of small 
business and the development of high-unemployment areas, the social group most 
directly affected by the opening-up of the public markets being the work force of 
these markets. In such a case, therefore, the local decision-maker might be 
oriented to gain political consensus adopting a wide “public interest” objective 
which does not necessarily coincide with the selection of the most efficient firm.  
In the execution stage the capability and experience of bureaucratic structures 
are crucial. Are there relevant differences in the bureaucratic organizations at 
central and local levels? At local level, bureaucratic performance is likely to vary 
according with the size and the economic condition of the local governments as 
well as with the incentives they face. From this latter point of view a crucial issue 
                                                 
12
 Being Italy a member State of the European Union, its legislation on procurement needs to be 
designed according with the principles set up in the EU Directive. For more details of public 
works Italian legislation see Guccio, Pignataro and Rizzo,2008. 
13
 Open and restricted procedures are the rule and negotiated procedures can be adopted only in 
well defined circumstances. 
14
 Similar arguments have been applied by Rizzo (2000) in the analysis of UE procurement rules 
to explain the limited opening up of the EU procurement market. . 
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refers to the financing side. In Italy, in the public works field the role of own local 
resources is limited, public investment being mainly financed out of central 
government  transfers. 15  This implies that local governments might find 
convenient to try to “ride the common” in order to maximize the amount of 
national resources and enlarge their infrastructure endowment. However, such a 
tendency of the political decision makers is not necessarily backed by adequate 
bureaucratic structures able to carry on the planning and design activities as well 
as the monitoring at the execution stage. The likely effects might be the need for 
the revision of the project in the execution phase with the likely consequence that 
works are interrupted and delays are generated. Nor the sponsor – the central 
government – exerts any effective control on the use of funds so that no sanctions 
or penalties are implied for delays or even for uncompleted works.16  
 
 
3. SEARCHING FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF THE PERFORMANCE 
OF PUBLIC WORKS 
 
3.1 Following the discussion in the previous section, we make an attempt to check 
whether the efficiency in the execution of public works contracts varies according 
to the level of government involved. The analysis carried out in this paper is of an 
empirical nature, and refers to data drawn from a large sample of Italian public 
works. The obvious problems to be faced in this analysis are basically related to 
the identification of: i) a suitable indicator for execution problems and ii) the 
different levels of government.   
As for the first problem, the execution of a public work can be characterized by 
different events (revision of the initial project, renegotiation, etc.) that can alter 
the initial project and affect the governments' performance in the realization of 
public works and, therefore, the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending. 
One obvious indicator of governments’ performance in the execution of a public 
work is represented by adaptation costs, i.e. the additional costs above the value of 
the winning bid, incurred by contracting works authorities. Another indicator is 
given by the time of completion of works: Bajari and Lewis (2008) underline its 
relevance for social welfare and, referring to highways construction, suggest that 
slow completion times may generate “significant negative externalities for 
commuters through increased gridlock and commuting times” (Bajari and Lewis, 
2008, p. 1). In other words, while completion time may generate costs overrun for 
public finance (even if it is not necessarily so), it is the source of negative effects 
on social welfare at large. We, then, choose to consider this variable for the 
empirical investigation of the differences in performance across the different 
levels of government, because it may also be regarded as a significant indicator of 
                                                 
15
 Central government financing usually takes two forms: specific grants to local government or 
the payment of the mortgage  to the bank which has financed the investment.  
16
 As it has been recently pointed out (Commissione tecnica della finanza pubblica, 2008) the 
monitoring system is rather weak: at central level bureaucrats are evaluated only on financial 
indicators – e.g. the share of allocation which is transferred to lower governments – rather than on 
the outcome obtained by the recipients. 
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the impact of their differential closeness to citizens' preferences.  
In general terms, we can define the variable as the difference between actual 
completion time and expected completion time, as indicated at the moment of 
signing the contract with the firm, which was awarded the public work. This 
variable, which we will call delay (DEL), can take on positive values, in case of 
an actual delay in the completion of the work, negative values if the work is 
completed earlier than expected, and a zero value if it is completed perfectly on 
time. Alternatively, it could be possible to consider as delayed those works that are 
completed after the date agreed on in the contract, while all the other works, 
including those finished earlier, are not delayed. We can, therefore use another 
variable, which we will call (C_DEL), having a zero value for all the works 
completed within the contractual deadline and positive values for those delayed. 
In this case we not discriminate between public work completed earlier than 
expected or perfectly on time.  
A different empirical strategy for the evaluation of the impact of different 
factors on the delay is to consider the “event” of delay. In this case, the natural 
way is to use a binary variable taking on values of zero, when the work is 
completed on time, or even earlier, and 1 if completion is delayed with respect to 
the expected time (P_DEL). The advantage of this approach is to distinguish for 
the two events allowing also to estimate the relative probabilities. However the 
limit of this approach is that it does not discriminate against the different extent of 
delays.  
As for the second problem, the identification of the different levels of 
government, we group procurers according to an institutional differentiation, 
which is relevant for Italy: Central Government (basically, State administrations - 
C_GOV), Local Governments (regions, provinces, municipalities – L_GOV),  
Institutions (Public institutions with budget autonomy, such as Local Health 
Authorities and Public Hospitals, etc.- INST), Public enterprises (ANAS, FS, 
Poste s.p.a. – P_ENT) and Private Companies (e.g. Concessionaires – 
PRIV_COM ).  
 
3.2  The objective of our empirical analysis is to test whether delay, as measured 
by the variables defined in 3.1, systematically depends on the “identity” of public 
procurers, using different estimation models. To carry out such a test, we need to 
control for several variables that may affect the delay in the execution of public 
works, across the different institutions.  
Before considering which control variables will be used in the empirical 
analysis, two further variables referring to the identity of procurers deserve to be 
taken into account. They aim at characterizing one of the layers of government, as 
defined in section 2.1, namely local governments. First of all, these institutions 
may be rather heterogeneous, in terms of efficient execution behaviour, with 
respect to their size. Indeed, the existence of several municipalities of very small 
dimensions may imply that these tendering authorities might not be able to exploit 
the economies of scale and might exhibit lower administrative capacities in 
monitoring the implementation of the contract. To take into account such a 
problem we use a dummy variable, with value 1 when the contracting authority is 
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a local government with less than 5,000 inhabitants (S_COUN). The other 
variable, which captures one further potential source of heterogeneity across local 
governments, is  representative of their role in financing the public work. On the 
grounds of the considerations developed in section 1, it is reasonable to assume 
that the incentives toward the efficient performance of the tendering authority are 
stronger the greater is its financial effort, i.e. the share of its own resources in the 
financing of the public work. To take into account these incentives we use a 
dummy variable with value 1 when the public work is mainly financed out of the 
contracting authority own resources (O_FIN).   
As for the control variables, first of all, we consider the nature of the 
procurement procedure. In a previous paper (Guccio, Pignataro, Rizzo, 2008), we 
tested the differential impact of procurement procedures on renegotiation of the 
initial contract and on its costs, and showed that competitive procurement 
procedures, such as auctions, are associated to higher adaptation costs, in the 
implementation stage, than negotiated procedures. We will, therefore, check 
whether the procurement procedure used to award the contract for the realisation 
of the public work has also an impact on the time of completion, using a dummy 
variable (OPEN), taking on value 1 when the procedure is an auction, and 0 
otherwise.  
Other factors, which can affect the delay in the completion of the work and, 
therefore, cause a difference with respect to the original expected time of 
completion are: the complexity of the work, the execution mode, the market 
characteristics and other environmental factors.  
As far as the complexity of works is concerned, our hypothesis is that contracts 
execution becomes more uncertain the higher the degree of complexity of the 
work, and, therefore, the completion time is more likely to be higher than the 
expected time of completion. As proxies for complexity we use the estimated total 
value of the work by the contracting authority (ETV), and an index measuring the 
“composition” of the work (calculated on the different sub-categories involved in 
the work, weighed for their relative amount - WCI) 17. We also differentiate 
between “new” works and repair/restructuring ones, using the dummy variable 
T_W (it takes on a value equal to 1 for the new works). We expect that the degree 
of complexity, and the likelihood of delays, is increasing with new works.  
As for the execution mode, the factors which may affect the time of completion 
are: the presence of subcontractors in the execution of the work (SUB);  the 
existence of legal disputes between the firm and the contracting authority (DIS); 
whether the contractual obligation of the firm includes the completion of the 
design of the project, what is known in Italy as executive project (PROJ). Our 
hypothesis is that the variables SUB and DIS tend to increase the completion  
time, and make more likely a delay in completion. The effects of the variable 
PROJ need some further comments because they are not unambiguous: on one 
hand, the lack of an executive project when the contracting authority bids for its 
                                                 
17
 Public works are articulated in sub-categories, i.e. the different components of the overall work, 
which contribute, according with their relative relevance for the specific work, to the estimated 
total value.  It is plausible to assume that the more complex is a public work the higher is the 
number of sub-categories involved in its implementation. 
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procurement and, therefore, the possibility for the firm to intervene on the project, 
could allow for the adoption of technical solutions consistent with its productive 
capacities and know-how and could reduce the pressure on renegotiation and on 
changes of the original projects, thus reducing the chance of delays in the 
execution. On the other hand, however, the separation of the activities of project 
and execution may introduce a “conflict of interests” between the 
engineer/architect and the firm executing the work, with more constraints on the 
firm and, therefore, less room for its opportunistic behaviour (La Pecorella – 
Rizzo 2002), with potential positive effects on the time of completion. In 
principle, there is no reason to state in advance the direction of the compensation 
between the two effects, and we leave it to the results of the empirical analysis.  
The market characteristics may play a role in connection with the relevance of 
reputation for the firm. Reputation is likely to increase the effort of firms to 
complete works on time. Ceteris paribus, the relevance of such a variable depends 
on the market competition level and on the market share of the firm. To measure 
market competition we employ the number of potential bidders (i.e. the number of 
firms qualified for the public work category -e.g. roads, railways, etc.- and value 
at national level – P_BID). The expected sign of this variable is positive: the 
higher the competition, the lower the probability of being awarded a contract in 
the future and, therefore, the lower the future value of reputation and the weaker 
the incentive for the firm to make efforts for completing on time. It is also 
important, however, to evaluate the position of the winning bidder within the 
market. We have, therefore, estimated the market leadership as the number of 
contracts awarded to each firm by the contracting authorities, included in the data 
set in the period under consideration (LEAD). In a market in which tendering is 
effective in selecting the best bidder and assuming that quality is homogeneous 
across firms for the works of the same category and size, the market leadership 
could be considered as cost leadership. In this case, the greater the market 
leadership, the higher the probability of being awarded contracts in the future and, 
therefore, the greater the value of reputation and the stronger the effort to 
complete on time. Finally, we consider as a proxy for the value of the long-term 
relationship between the firm and the specific contracting authority, the number of 
contracts awarded to each firm by the same authority (INT) . The expected  sign 
for this variable is negative, since the interaction is likely to prevent inefficient 
behaviour of the firm and, therefore, the lower is the chance of delays in the 
completion of the work.  
Finally, we take into consideration environmental factors that may characterise 
the political and socio-economic context in which public works are decided and 
executed. We focus on one of them, namely the incidence of corruption and, more 
generally, the “illegal” distortion of the public decision-making and 
implementation process, since it may be distributed unevenly along the different 
levels of government, thus potentially distorting the results of our main test. We 
are able to capture this factor, using, as a proxy, the incidence of the so called 
“association” crimes for 100,000 inhabitants at provincial level (CORR).  
We also believe that the values of the dependent variable DEL may be 
idiosyncratically distributed across the different units, since the expected time of 
completion is a matter of “subjective” estimate by each of them. In other words, 
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the delay can increase or decrease, simply as the result of underestimation or 
overestimation of the expected time of completion. Therefore, we also control for 
this variable (ED).  
Finally we control for the year of award of the public work. The list of the 
variables we will use is summarised in table 1. 
 
Table 1 – List of variables 
NAME VARIABLE 
Dependent variable 
DEL Delay  
C_DEL Contractual delay 
P_DEL Dummy for delay 
Independent variables 
C_GOV Central Government  
L_GOV Sub-Central Governments 
INST Institutions 
P_ENT Public Enterprises 
PRIV_COM Private Companies 
S_COUN Dummy for municipalities with a population less that 5,000 inhabitants  
O_FIN Dummy for the financial source of the work – 1 when the prevailing source is the budget of the contracting authority 
OPEN Dummy for open tendering procedures 
SUB Dummy for subcontracting  
PROJ Dummy for the completion of the project by the firm 
DIS Dummy for legal dispute 
ED Estimated time of completion (in days) 
ETV  Estimated total value 
WCI Weighted public work composition index 
INT   Past relationships between firm and contracting authority 
LEAD  Number of contracts awarded by winning bidder in the  market 
P_BID   Number of firms qualified for the work category and value   
T_W Type of work (new/repair) 
CORR Associative crime incidence for 100.000  inhabitants at provincial level 
 
 
 
4. DATA EMPLOYED AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1.  The data used in this analysis refer to a sample of Italian public works 
carried out between 2000 and 2004. The data are collected by Osservatorio per i 
lavori pubblici of the “Autorità di Vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi 
e forniture”. The observation unit is given by the single public work and very 
detailed information are available on the various steps of the procedure – project, 
selection of the contractor, realization and conclusion of the work. The sample 
refers to 9,885 public works, whose costs range from 150,000 euros to 5 million 
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euros, awarded in the period 2000-2004 and completed by 2005.18 Our sample 
refers to public works, distributed along 16 different categories.19 Since the 
number of observations for each category is not the same, we work with an 
unbalanced panel data. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the number of 
contracts awarded per year, the total amount, the mean value of contracts, as 
distributed for the different groups of contracting authorities.  
 
 
Table 2 - Composition of the sample by contracting authorities – public works above 
150,000 euros  ( value at current prices )  
 
Contracting authorities Number of 
observations Mean  St. Dev. 
Maximum 
amount 
Minimum 
amount 
Central government 545.00 364,155.80 429,263.96 4,441,529.00 150,135.00 
Local government 6,978.00 376,051.35 359,003.55 4,777,537.00 150,000.00 
Institutions  1,212.00 505,286.26 564,026.44 4,815,961.00 150,000.00 
Public enterprises 606.00 321,276.46 285,910.94 3,436,940.00 150,082.00 
Private concessionaires 529.00 609,038.29 636,414.99 4,965,733.00 150,024.00 
Total 9,870.00 400,388.34 414,186.12 4,965,733.00 150,000.00 
Source: our elaboration on data provided by Autorità di vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture 
 
Given the interest of the paper for the distribution of the delays in time of 
completion across different levels of government, table 3 shows some figures of 
the average number of days of the delay and on number of public work delayed.  
 
 
Table 3 – Distribution of delay by contracting authorities – public works above 150,000 
euros 
 
DEL (no. of days) Delay (no. of public works) 
Contracting authorities Number of obs. 
Mean  St. Dev. On time Delayed % delayed 
Central government 545.00 57.40 132.95 244.00 301.00 55.23 
Local government 6,978.00 127.64 161.66 1,739.00 5,239.00 75.08 
Institutions 1,212.00 115.84 161.10 315.00 897.00 74.01 
Public enterprises 606.00 31.26 77.83 266.00 340.00 56.11 
Private concessionaires 529.00 79.11 156.66 191.00 338.00 63.89 
Total 9,870.00 113.79 158.47 2,755.00 7,115.00 72.09 
                                                 
18
 The sample was selected on the basis of completeness of the records included in the data base. 
To limit heterogeneity, the public works costing over 5 millions euros were not included in the 
sample because of the longer time lag required to complete complex works. Moreover, public 
works with a final cost lower than the contract cost were not taken into account because of the lack 
of adequate information.  
19
 These categories cover all the fields of public works, ranging for instance from  roads and 
highways to schools or environmental protection infrastructures.  
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 Source: our elaboration on data provided by Autorità di vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture 
 
As a point out in previous section we focus the attention upon the execution 
stage of public works and we look at completion time as a possible performance 
evaluation. The distributions of the values of the two variables defined before, 
DEL and C_DEL are represented in figures 1 and 2.  
 
Figure 1 – Distribution of values of DEL 
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 Source: our elaboration on data provided by Autorità di vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture 
 
Figure 2 – Distribution of values of C_DEL 
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 Source: our elaboration on data provided by Autorità di vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture 
 
The data show that, in our sample, less than 25% of the works are completed 
on time (or even earlier than expected) and, therefore, the delay issue is a very 
relevant one. Delay is, on average, of about four months. The percentage of works 
delayed is not uniformly distributed according to the different institutions: local 
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governments show the highest percentage of delayed works, as well as the highest 
delay on average. Finally, some summary statistics related to the variables 
presented in sections 3.1 and 3.2, and summarized in table 1, are presented in the 
following table 4.  
 
Table 4 – Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DEL 9870 113.79 158.47 -338.00 1,323.00 
C_DEL 9870 120.50 150.76 0.00 1323.00 
P_DEL 9870 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
C_GOV 9870 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
L_GOV 9870 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 
INST 9870 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
P_ENT 9870 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
PRIV_COM 9870 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
S_COUN 9870 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
O_FIN 9870 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 
OPEN 9870 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 
SUB 9870 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
PROJ 9870 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 
DIS 9870 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
ED 9870 212.27 137.83 3.00 1,327.00 
ETV  9870 400,388.30 414,186.10 150,000.00 4,965,733.00 
WCI 9870 1.20 0.34 1.00 4.00 
INT   9870 2.42 3.37 1.00 60.00 
LEAD  9870 17.87 37.92 1.00 436.00 
P_BID   9870 2,250.01 1,397.18 1.00 5,707.00 
T_W 9870 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
CORR 9870 5.75 2.97 1.27 18.35 
 
 Source: our elaboration on data provided by Autorità di vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture 
 
 
5.  MODELS ESTIMATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
5.1  The two estimated models, as related to the two dependent variables, are 
represented below:  
DEL
 ij = β0 + EF β + εij                      [1.a] ;      
C_DEL
 ij = β0 + EF β + εij                            [1.b]      
where DELij stands for delay in public work i in category j; C_DELij stands for 
contractual delay in public work i in category j; EF is a matrix of the control 
variables described in section 2.2 and ε are disturbance terms. As we pointed out 
earlier, our sample refers to  public works distributed along 16 different 
categories. To take into account the different characteristics of each category, we 
employ a GLS panel model with random effects. Also to control for 
heteroskedasticity we used robust standard error.  
The estimate results for each model as well as standard errors and elasticities 
are shown in table 5. The coefficients for the institutional dummies are computed 
with respect to central government.  
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Table 5 – Estimation results (entire sample) 
DEL C_DEL Variable β se elasticities β Se elasticities 
Constant -35.406*** (-10.954)  -15.682 (-10.045)  
L_GOV 41.783*** (-6.253) 0,260 34.826*** (-5.624) 0,204 
INST 38.891*** (-7.363) 0,042 30.767*** (-6.759) 0,031 
P_ENT -41.847*** (-6.885) -0,023 -45.021*** (-6.182) -0,023 
PRIV_COM 4.455 (-8.898) 0,002 5.837 (-8.030) 0,003 
S_COUN 60.840*** (-5.805) 0,061 58.270*** (-5.674) 0,055 
O_FIN -14.936*** (-3.261) -0,056 -14.500*** (-3.118) -0,051 
OPEN 3.122 (-4.032) 0,022 3.112 (-3.880) 0,021 
SUB 6.962* (-3.826) 0,048 6.760* (-3.661) 0,044 
PROJ 15.642*** (-3.752) 0,110 15.191*** (-3.515) 0,101 
DIS 58.885*** (-13.580) 0,010 56.809*** (-13.223) 0,009 
ED -0.136*** (0.013) -0,254 -0.088*** (0.012) -0,154 
ETV  0.000*** (0.000) 0,178 0.000*** (0.000) 0,147 
WCI 11.210** (-4.713) 0,118 7.503* (-4.513) 0,075 
INT   -2.199*** (0.425) -0,047 -1.733*** (0.392) -0,035 
LEAD 0.003** (0.001) 0,057 0.003** (0.001) 0,048 
P_BID   -0.094** (0.040) -0,015 -0.090** (0.038) -0,013 
T_W 19.226*** (-3.449) 0,051 17.382*** (-3.328) 0,044 
CORR 2.234*** (0.540) 0,113 2.166*** (0.518) 0,103 
d_2000 99.395*** (-6.213) 0,207 88.499*** (-5.592) 0,174 
d_2001 76.701*** (-5.703) 0,212 66.887*** (-5.032) 0,175 
d_2002 71.457*** (-5.775) 0,160 61.879*** (-5.103) 0,131 
d_2003 42.218*** (-5.836) 0,056 34.102*** (-5.131) 0,042 
Observations 9,870   9,870   
categories 16   16   
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
The impact of the other variables, when significant, has the expected sign. The 
nature of the procurement procedure does not seem to play a role in delayed 
completion of the works. As for the execution mode, the significant variables are 
DIS, that is the existence of legal disputes between the firm and the contracting 
authority, which exerts a positive impact on the completion time, and PROJ, that 
is whether the firm is in charge of designing the executive project of the work, 
which has also a positive sign. The latter result implies that in such a case the firm 
has more room for opportunistic behaviour, being in charge of the project as well 
as of the implementation of the work, and the prevalence of this incentive can 
delay the completion of the work. The complexity of the work is positively 
correlated to delay, and significantly in all the three dimensions we chose. The 
factors that can be representative of some form of reputation and that can increase 
the chance of being awarded future contracts (INT and LEAD) are highly 
significant and negatively correlated to delay. Time of completion is also 
increased by an environment characterised by higher rates of crime. As expected, 
the dependent variable is affected by the estimation of the time of completion: the 
higher the latter the lower the delay.  
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5.2 The main result, that is the longer delays characterising local government, is 
confirmed when considering sub-samples, defined according to homogenous 
types of work. We tried with roads: this is a kind of work, which has a limited 
differentiation with respect to other categories of works. The results are shown in 
table 6, and are substantially identical to the ones obtained for the entire sample20.  
Table 6 -  Estimation results (roads) 
DEL Variable β Se 
Constant -93.637*** (33.747) 
L_GOV 57.467* (29.677) 
INST 50.291 (33.170) 
P_ENT -26.808 (29.763) 
PRIV_COM 4.502 (31.274) 
S_COUN 61.023*** (9.646) 
O_FIN -2.511 (5.324) 
OPEN -2.917 (6.720) 
SUB 20.101*** (5.645) 
PROJ 7.477 (6.661) 
DIS 42.750** (20.277) 
ED -0.154*** (0.023) 
ETV  0.000*** (0.000) 
WCI 36.147*** (11.889) 
INT   -1.548*** (0.547) 
LEAD 0.003 (0.002) 
P_BID   -0.198*** (0.059) 
T_W 26.640*** (5.737) 
CORR 3.167*** (0.851) 
d_2000 90.235*** (9.921) 
d_2001 63.226*** (8.936) 
d_2002 54.897*** (8.884) 
d_2003 32.588*** (9.042) 
Observations 3,218  
Categories 1  
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
5.3   As a point out in section 3.1 a different approach to estimate the impact of 
the different factors on the delay is to consider the “event” of delay. The natural 
approach is to use a binary variable taking on values of zero, when the work is 
completed on time, or even earlier, and 1 if completion is delayed with respect to 
the expected time. In this estimate we employ a logit model with random effects. 
In terms of latent variable the estimated model can be expressed as: 
 
P_DEL*
 ij = β0 + EF β + εij            [2] 
             
where P_DELij=1 if P_DEL*ij > 0 and P_DELij = 0  if P_DEL*ij  >= 0  
 
                                                 
20
 Since the model is estimated just for one category of works, the estimation is transformed in a 
standard OLS, and the model, for each category j, is DELi = = β0 + EF β + εi.  
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EF is a matrix of the control variables described in the previous section and ε are 
error terms with logistic distribution. The estimation results are shown in table 7 
and tend to confirm previous results.  
Overall, then, what clearly and robustly emerges from the empirical analysis 
carried out on the data used in this paper, is that local governments are less 
efficient, than other contracting authorities, especially at the central government 
level, in ensuring a timely completion of public works. In the next section we 
provide some preliminary comments with the indication of potential further 
developments.  
 
Table 7 – Estimation results with logit model 
 
P_DEL 
Variable 
β se 
Constant -0.886*** (0.198) 
L_GOV 0.732*** (0.110) 
INST 0.800*** (0.133) 
P_ENT -0.020 (0.137) 
PRIV_COM 0.357** (0.144) 
S_COUN 0.502*** (0.088) 
O_FIN -0.148*** (0.052) 
OPEN 0.268*** (0.063) 
SUB 0.081 (0.058) 
PROJ 0.377*** (0.059) 
DIS 0.500** (0.208) 
ED -0.004*** (0.000) 
ETV 0.000*** (0.000) 
WCI 0.323*** (0.082) 
INT   -0.038*** (0.007) 
LEAD 0.000*** (0.000) 
P_BID   -0.000 (0.001) 
T_W 0.269*** (0.055) 
CORR 0.013 (0.008) 
d_2000 0.841*** (0.117) 
d_2001 0.662*** (0.113) 
d_2002 0.686*** (0.114) 
d_2003 0.441*** (0.120) 
Observations 9,870  
Categories 16  
 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively  
 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
What is of interest here is to try to give an interpretation of the result of the 
empirical analysis carried out in this paper, in the light of the discussion in section 
1. This is relevant to understand whether decentralisation matters in the execution 
of public works and for discussing the policy implications, in terms of 
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organisation of the public works sector.  
Notwithstanding the fact that efficiency in the execution of public works is 
generally crucial to achieve the benefits expected from given choices of allocation 
of resources, decentralisation does not seem to provide a pressure on local 
governments and its bureaucracies to act efficiently, which should arise from their 
proximity to the beneficiaries of the works.  
One explanation of the result is that the organisation of the bureaucracy 
managing the execution of public works at the local level is not efficient. There 
are different potential justifications for this inefficiency. The small dimension of 
several municipalities in Italy obstacles the achievement of an efficient dimension 
of the offices in charge of monitoring the execution of public works and the 
possibility of having all the proper professional competences needed for this task. 
The result obtained checking for the dimension supports such an explanation. A 
further way to check for this effect requires to estimate the variability of delay 
along the different population sizes of local governments. The dimension effect 
could also be reconnected, ceteris paribus, to the quantity and nature of public 
works carried out, which could be tested considering the number and the amount 
(total and per work) of public works carried out by each local government. It 
could also be interesting to check whether works supervision is attributed to 
internal or external personnel, and the average number of works supervised per 
unit of personnel.  
Another explanation for the relative inefficiency of decentralized public 
works relies refers to the financing system operating for local governments public 
works. When the role of own local resources is not crucial and public investment 
are mainly financed out of central government transfers local governments might 
find convenient to maximize the amount of national resources and enlarge their 
infrastructure endowment, regardless the adequacy of their planning, design and 
monitoring capabilities. Nor the sponsor – the central government –  exert any 
effective control on the use of funds so that no sanctions or penalties are implied 
for delays or even for uncompleted works. The result obtained checking for the 
financial effort of the contracting authority supports such an explanation 
The main policy implications arising from empirical evidence of 
organisational inefficiency is, first, to move to centralised forms of management 
of public works, capable to exploit the economies of scale and to employ adequate 
bureaucratic and managerial competences. This does not seem a naïve suggestion, 
since the Italian law already provides for delegation of works to provincial units, 
by local municipalities, whenever the money value of works is considerable, 
though this provision is very rarely implemented. Moreover, a further implication 
is to move to change the financing system of the local investment moving from 
specific grants to block matching grant enhancing the responsibility and the 
accountability of the local decision maker. 
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